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NOTES
Defective Formation and Suits in the Corporate Name
Failure to comply with an applicable statute relative to the formation of
a corporation may result in a wide departure from the legal consequences of
perfect compliance. The association may or may not be able to sue in its
"corporate" name; it may or may not be subject to suit in its "corporate"
name; the members of the association may 1 or may not 2 be liable as partners; the association may be taxable as an association or as a partnership; 3
land conveyed by the association in its "corporate" name may or may not
confer on the grantee a good title to the land; 4 the association may 5 or may
not 6 be able to condemn land for a right of way; the association may 7 or
may not 8 be able to recover on share subscriptions; an officer who has appropriated the association's money may or may not be guilty of embezzlement from a corporation; 9 there may or may not be a right of removal to
the federal courts. 10
The traditional theory in regard to these problems is that if the association has complied with the incorporation laws to such an extent as to create
a "de facto" corporation, all the legal attributes of a corporation result,
except that the corporate existence may be terminated by a quo warranto
proceeding brought by the state." But if the compliance falls short of this
"de facto" standard, the association has attributes similar to those of a
partnership. Although some writers limit the doctrine by classifying certain of the above situations as exceptions to the rule, 2 generally the thought
is that an association is or is not a "de facto" corporation. No distinctions
are made as to the purposes for which the determination of the association's
nature is desired.
The reported cases, however, do not lend themselves to any such simple
analysis and it is quite possible that the legal attributes of a corporation
may obtain in some of the above circumstances, and those of a partnership
in others, even though the defects in organization be the same.
The principal reason for requiring those seeking to form a corporation
to take all the steps which are now specified by incorporation statutes is to
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protect those who might deal with or have a claim against the corporation.
There may be additional motives (e. g., securing to the state of information for use in the collection of taxes and fees) behind such requirements
as filing the articles or a copy thereof with the secretary of state, but protection of creditors is the primary goal. If a mere agreement among individuals could create a corporation, a door to fraud would be open. The
members could hide behind the cloak of limited liability, while the person
dealing with the association, or asserting a claim against it, would have no
source of information concerning its structure, activities and financial condition. One means of inducing compliance with the statutory provisions
relative to incorporating is, in the event of non-compliance, to deny the
association the privileges of a corporation, particularly in case of serious
defects. If failure to treat the association as a corporation would, in a
given instance, penalize an innocent party and not the defective association,
this unfortunate result should be avoided wherever other considerations of
greater importance are not involved. 13 On the other hand, if the person
who will be benefited by denying corporate consequences is one of a class
whom the statute was designed to protect, a refusal to recognize the existence
of a corporate attribute would seem desirable. But in the latter situations
there is a "fairness" factor which courts take into account. This is especially true in cases where an attempt is made to hold members of the association liable as partners for a debt of the association. Here the person to
be benefited by refusing to allow corporate consequences is one of the
class which the statutes relative to incorporating aim to protect. The imposition of individual liability on the members is a strong inducement for
compliance by the associates. But unless the defect in organization is a
serious one, the policy of "fairness" forbids holding members liable as
partners when they have not contracted for such liability and when some
of them are not personally to blame for the defect. The deciding factors in
these cases are whether the defect is serious and whether the dealings have
been on a corporate basis.' 4
The purpose of this general discussion is merely to point out that the
factors which influence the courts in determining whether or not to allow
a corporate consequence in a specific instance will vary greatly according
to the nature of the problem. Some of the courts have apparently recog13. For example, a person purchasing land from a defectively organized corporation, the
deed terming the grantor a corporation, might have his title controverted by some third person. In such a case the fair result would seem to be to recognize as valid the title obtained
from the "corporation", particularly if the original grantee has conveyed to an innocent
purchaser, whose title is then contested. None of the statutory provisions are for the benefit
of a third person who has never dealt with or had a claim against the association, and the
policy of inducing compliance by refusing corporate consequences would have no application
here because the loss would not fall on the association or the members thereof. Courts in
such a situation have in fact held the grantee's title valid. City of Denver v. Mullen, 7 Colo.
345, 3 Pac. 693 (1884) ; Society Perun v. City of Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481, 3 N. E. 357
(1885) ; see Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation--A. De Facto Corporations (1967)
2o -ARv. L. REv. 456, 457n.
14. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co. v. Robertson, 296 Ill. 92, 129 N. E. 523 (ig2o) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Fohey, iii Miss. 654, 71 So. 9o6 (1916) ; Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa.
303, 28 Atl. 249 (1893). A compilation of the cases in this field indicates that the most important factor is whether dealings were on a corporate basis. Where the dealings were on a
corporate basis the ratio is practically 2 to i in favor of non-liability. Where the dealings
were not on a corporate basis the ratio is i0 to I in favor of holding the members liable.
FREY, CAsFs AND STATuTEs ON

Busrass AssoclATioxs (1935) 64.
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nized this fact in reconciling their own decisions. 15 The comparative maze
surrounding the field of "de facto" corporations will be relatively clarified
if the problems are recognized as separate, and the answers to each not
necessarily to be found in the answer to a general query as to the existence
or non-existence of a "de facto" corporate body.
The present investigation is confined to the ability of a defectively
formed "corporation" to sue in its "corporate" name, and the liability of
the association to a suit against it in its "corporate" name.
Effect of "Dealings on a Corporate Basis"
Before investigating the consequences which have attended each type
of defect, it may be well to discuss a factor which runs through the cases
and which is regarded by the courts as legally important, namely, whether
the dealings between the association and the other party were on a corporate
basis or otherwise.
The legal effect of dealings on a corporate basis is by no means clear
as regards the use of the corporate label in lawsuits involving the association. 16 Impressed with the importance of this factor, some courts allow
the association to sue in the corporate name if the dealings were on a corporate basis, with no mention of any defects that may exist. 1 7 If serious
defects are present, however, many courts deny the association the use of
the corporate name, though it had been used in dealings with the other
party. 18 By far the most confusion in this connection has arisen from the
use of the term "estoppel", and this deserves particular attention.
It is often said that because the party dealing with the association failed
to object to the use of a name apparently describing a corporation, he is
estopped to deny that it is a corporation.' 9 This is obviously far afield from
a true estoppel, which operates only when the person to be estopped has
made a false representation, under circumstances likely to induce a third
person to act to his detriment, and the third person has so acted. In the
situation under discussion, there is in fact no representation by the party
dealing with the association. If any representation is made, it is made by
the association. And even if some representation by the other party can be
discovered, it is ordinarily impossible to establish any reliance thereon by
the association to its injury.
If the facts are not such as to warrant the application of a true estoppel,
why do the courts invoke this doctrine and so stretch it when dealings are
I5.See Schmitt v. Potter Title & Trust Co., 61 Pa. Super. 301, 308 (1915) ; Henry v.
Centralia & Chester R. R., 121 Ill. 264, 267, 12 N. E. 744, 745 (1887).
16. In one case the presence of dealings on a corporate basis appeared to influence the
court in deciding whether or not there was a de facto corporation. Gilman v. Druse, iii
Wis. 400, 87 N. W. 557 (19O1). In two cases the courts seemed to feel that both a de facto
corporation and dealings on a corporate basis were needed in order to allow corporate consequences. Washington Investment Ass'n v. Slantey, 38 Ore. 319, 63 Pac. 489 (19Ol);
Black River Improvement Co. v. Holway, 85 Wis. 344, 55 N. W. 418 (1893); see Note
(1920) 5 MARQ. L. REV. 46, 47.
17. Societe Titanor v. Paxton & Vierling, 124 Neb. 570, 247 N. W. 356 (1933) ; Montoya v. Hubbell, 28 N. Mex. 250, 210 Pac. 227 (1922) ; Note (1920) 5 MARQ. L. REV. 46, 47.
18. Aspen Water & Light Co. v. City of Aspen, 5 Colo. App. 12, 37 Pac. 728 (1894);
Imperial Building Co. v. Chicago Open Board of Trade, 238 Ill. IoO, 87 N. E. 167 (1908);
Eastern Products Corps. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R., 151 Tenn. 239, 269 S. W. 4 (1924).
19. See Estey Manufacturing Co. v. Runnels, 55 Mich. 130, 133, 2o N. W. 823, 825
(1884) ; Hagerman v. Ohio Building & Savings Ass'n, 25 Ohio St. 186, 201 (1874).
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on a corporate basis? A plausible explanation of this result may be hazarded.
When the other party is suing the members of the association individually,
as if partners, it is natural that courts rebel at allowing recovery where
the dealings were on a corporate basis. The plaintiff understood, in his
dealings with the association, that it purported to be a corporation, and an
understandable reaction is that he should have recourse only to the association assets for payment of the obligation. To allow him a right of action
against the individual members is to grant him a windfall at the expense of
persons who did not contract for such liability. The above reasoning may
be sufficient justification for withholding relief in such cases, without
ascribing the plaintiff's frustration to "estoppel." But the term is used,
and the courts seem to regard these cases as setting up a doctrine that when
the dealings are on a corporate basis, the other party is estopped to deny
the corporate nature of the association. Accordingly, when confronted
with cases in which the association is suing the other party, many courts
adopt the procedure of "estopping" the defendant from denying the association's privilege of suing in the corporate name, if he had dealt with what
purported to be a corporation.
Setting aside for the moment the question of whether the cases warrant the use of "estoppel" language, it may be agreed that it is often reasonable to disregard objections to suit in the corporate name. The association,
if denied the use of its corporate name, generally still has its right of action
which may be enforced in the names of its members. 20 The result of such
a denial is actually a postponement of a hearing on the merits. But it is still
difficult to appreciate the necessity of reaching the result by the device of
an inapplicable concept, and it would seem to be better for the courts to
discontinue use of the term "estoppel" in such cases.
The impropriety of using the term "estoppel" is further emphasized
by a recent tendency to extend the scope of the concept of dealing on a corporate basis. The original meaning attached to the expression was that
the claim arose out of a contract in which the association was named as a
corporation, and in such a case it could truly be said that the other party had
voluntarily dealt with a purported corporation. In one case, the plaintiff
purchased a ticket for a ride, from a traction company, and this was considered a "dealing on a corporate basis" in connection with a resulting claim
in tort for the negligence of the company's employees. 2 1 In another case,
the recognition of the association as a corporation came only after the
execution of the contract on which suit was brought.2 2 Filing a counterclaim against the association had also been held to "estop" the defendant
from contesting the plaintiff's corporate existence. 23 In the case of Burke
v. Barnum & Bailey,24 a spectator was injured by negligence of the de-

20. It is conceivable that the defendant could successfully contend that he had been
willing to deal only with a corporate body, and could not be forced to defend a suit brought
by individuals. In such a case denial of the privilege of suing in the corporate name would
of course have serious effects. This contention has not been encountered in the cases, however, and has apparently had no bearing on the results.
21. Pinkerton v. Pennsylvania Traction Co., 193 Pa. 229, 44 AtI. 284 (1899).
22. Societe Titanor v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works, 124 Neb. 570, 247 N. W. 356

(1933).

Bell v. Commercial Investment Trust Co., 118 Okla. 230, 246 Pac. iio2 (1926).
This is an action against the association, as dis1027 (1917).
tinguished from actions by the association, which we have so far been considering. It is included at this point to show the extremes to which the concept of estoppel has been stretched.
23.
24.

4o R. I. 71, 99 Atl.
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fendant association, and a writ of foreign attachment was served on the
defendant's property. The association executed a bond to the sheriff for
the release of its property, naming itself in the bond as a corporation. The
court held that this "estopped" the defendant from showing that it was in
fact a partnership. These cases, it seems clear, have wandered far from
the original theory that contractual dealings on a corporate basis would
preclude a party from later denying the corporate existence. In none of
the cases does "estoppel" seem to be a particularly helpful concept in reaching an equitable result. There appears to be considerable confusion in the
reasoning of the courts, and nowhere is it so clearly shown as in the case of
Munter v. Ideal Peerless Laundry.25 The association had taken out workmen's compensation insurance in its corporate name from the defendant. No
effort at all was made to incorporate. One of the association members was
injured and brought suit against the defendant insurance company, basing
his claim on an injury incurred while working for the "corporation" named
in the contract. The court stated that the defendant was "estopped" from
attacking the association's corporate existence because it had dealt with it on
a corporate basis, but that it was not "estopped" from denying that the plaintiff worked for a corporation. The holding was that the plaintiff accordingly
but an attempt to follow the court's reasoning is decidedly
could not recover,
2 6
not profitable.

Insofar as the factor of "dealings on a corporate basis" tempts the
courts to resort to the device of estoppel, the effect in these cases is to confuse the issues, and at best to clothe desirable results in unclear language.
Aside from this, as will be seen later, there is little apparent relation between the existence of this factor and the case holdingsY However, in
one type of defect, namely organization with no valid statutory authority,
dealings on a corporate basis seem to be the deciding factor. As seen before, an increasing number of cases, without mentioning any defects at all,
allow the association to sue if the dealings were on a corporate basis. Some
of these cases may have involved defects which would have been serious
enough to deny suit in the corporate name, had dealings not been on a corporate basis. Although this must be a matter of speculation as far as the
reports are concerned, there is a distinct possibility that the results have
been influenced in this fashion by the factor of dealings on a corporate
basis. And finally, generalizations are made dangerous by the fact that in
the great majority of cases the dealings are on a corporate basis, thus making it difficult to predict the result if that factor is not present.
ABILITY TO SUE IN THE CORPORATE NAME IN GENERAL

The usual dogma as to the requisites of a de facto corporation is that
(I) the associates must have made an attempt to incorporate, resulting in
a "colorable" organization; (2) the attempt to incorporate must have been
25. 229 App. Div. 56, 241 N. Y. Supp. 411 (3d Dep't 193o).
26. The court indicates that a member of a partnership cannot recover on workmen's
compensation insurance taken out by his firm. The desire to reach this result while paying
respect to language in previous cases involving dealings on a corporate basis probably caused
this twisting. Id. at 58, 241 N. Y. Supp. at 414.
27. This is in sharp contrast to the effect of dealings on a corporate basis where the suit
is against the members to hold them individually liable for the debts of the association. See
note 14, supra.
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made in good faith; (3) there must have been a law authorizing the formation of such a corporation as was attempted; (4) there must have been a
user of some of the powers which such a corporation would possess. 28
This list of requisites furnishes a good framework for an inspection of the
cases concerning what is required for an association to sue in its corporate
name.
Before analyzing the court holdings in detail, however, it seems advisable to consider certain general policies which have influenced the results.
The effect of failure to allow suit in the corporate name is generally merely
to require that another suit be started, this time in the name of the members
as individuals. This is a waste of considerable time for the association, the
defendant and the court, without any compensating advantages for anyone
concerned, unless one of the parties wishes to postpone a trial on the merits.
Such a desire is not likely to receive sympathetic treatment from the courts,
and need not be given serious consideration. If the association has a valid
claim against a person, it should make no difference whether the group to
which he is forced to pay is suing in a corporate name or as if a partnership.
In either event he has to pay the debt and will only have to pay it once.
The language in which the statutes specify the acts to be done in the
organization of a corporation is generally of no importance in deciding
whether the association may bring suit in its corporate name. At one time
considerable importance was attached to this factor and the courts considered whether certain language created a condition precedent to corporate
existence 29 or was merely directory. 30 This was based on the theory that
if there was no corporation at all in existence, the association could not sue
in the corporate name. However, the desire of the courts to allow the association to sue in its "corporate" name in spite of a failure to do some act
specified by the legislature, led to some results which the above dogma does
not satisfactorily explain. Statutes, for example, might provide "as soon
as ten thousand dollars of said stock is subscribed and paid for, said corporation shall have the power to commence business", or "no corporation
shall be organized, until . . . (it) . . . shall pay . . . $ioo", and
the courts regarded these provisions as not creating conditions precedent. 3 '
Decisions of this sort emphasized the invalidity of such distinctions as were
based on the legislative intent as to when the corporation should come into
existence. This confusion pointed to the real problem-not whether the
association constitutes a corporation, but whether the association has sufficiently complied with the statute to allow it to sue in the corporate name.
There is legislation in many states eliminating the problem.32 Several
states have statutes to the effect that the organization of a corporation
28. See Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporatio-A. De Facto Corporations (1907)
20 HARV. L. REv. 456, 464; Dinerstein, De Facto Corporationsin Wisconsil (1919) 3 MAR(2.

L. REv. 137; Goode, A Study of Missouri Cases and Some Others Which Treat of De Facto
Corporations (1919) 3 ST. Louis L. REv. 175.
29. Boise City Canal Co. v. Pinkham, i Idaho 790 (1880) ; Lord & Robinson v. Essex
Building Ass'n, 37 Md. 32o (1872) ; Boston Acid Manufacturing Co. v. Moring, 81 Mass. 211

(186o).

30. Braintree Water Supply Co. v. Braintree, 146 Mass. 482, 16 N. E. 42o (1888).
31. Wells Co. v. Gastonia Cotton Manufacturing Co., 198 U. S. I77, 183 (I9O5);
Hughesdale Manufacturing Co. v. Vanner, 12 R. I. 491, 492 (I88o).

32. Some statutes raise a difficult question of interpretation. One of the best known
cases in this field, Jones v. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263, 40 Pac. 457 (1896), arose un-
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cannot be collaterally attacked. 3 Others provide that a corporation cannot
bring suit unless it has, for example, paid certain fees. 34 Cases controlled
by statute are not included in this study due to the excessive space which
would be required for their adequate treatment.
The following analysis of the cases has been based on the previously
mentioned requisites for the existence of a "de facto" corporation. Three
general classifications have also been made, (i) where the dealings were
not on a corporate basis, (2) where the dealings were on a corporate basis,
(3) where the defendant is an ex-official or an incorporator of the plaintiff
association. The reason for this third classification is that the courts appear
very reluctant to allow the defendant to profit by a defect which he was
responsible for or should have corrected.
(Unless otherwise indicated, the association was allowed to sue)
Dealings not
on a corporate basis

Defect not stated
x. Attempt to incorporate resulting in "colorable"
compliance
a. No acceptance of charter
b. Failure to pay fee
c. Failure to file certificate with state
d. Failure to file bond with state
e. Defects in the certificate itself
f. Defects in the execution of certificate
g. Failure to file certificate with county
h. Defects in certificate filed with county
i. Failure to file other papers with county
j. Failure of state authorities to do acts
k. Failure of special classes of corporations
to measure up to requirements
I. Insufficient number of shares subscribed
m. No stock issued
n. Failure to pay in capital
o Insufficient number of incorporators
2. Good'faith

a.
b.
3. No
a.
b.
c.

12 "

0

o
o
I

I

i

0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0

4
0

3
I

I
2
2

0
1

o

0
2
I
2

I
2

o

6
allow suit
i cannot sue
0
4

0

2

2

0

False statement in application to the state
0
Collusion for repayment of subscriptions
0
valid statute authorizing such a corporation
No statute to cover stated purpose
2 cannot sue
Illegal purpose
0
Statute unconstitutional
2 cannot sue

4. User

a. No user at all
b. No salaries to officers and bookkeeflers and
no business transacted
c. Failure to fulfill terms of special grant
d. Failure to elect directors

Dealings
on a corporate basis

Defendant
an official
(dealings
also on a corporate basis)
4

0
0
1
0
0

4

0
0

0

0

3 allow suit
I cannot sue
5

0
0

0

i cannot sue

i cannot sue

I

0

0

0
0

I

0

2

0

der a statute which provided that "no . . . corporation . . . shall have . . . any
corporate powers . . . until the said fee shall have been paid." The court held this constituted a condition precedent and did not allow the suit. In the opinion of the writer this
statute decides the question. The statement that it shall not exercise any corporate powers
includes the power to sue in the corporate name. and so is different from the statutes which
merely state when the corporation comes into existence.
33. See for example, S. D. Comop. LAws (1929) §239; NEm. COMP. STAT. (1929)

§ 24-221.
34. WAsn.

REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932)

§ 3842.
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Defect not stated. In a number of cases the court failed to consider or
state the defect because the dealings were on a corporate basis or because
the defendant was a former official of the association. That the courts are
reluctant to allow a former official to set up defects in the association's
organization is strikingly shown by the fact that in four of the nine cases
involving suits against a former official, the courts thought it unnecessary
to state the defect involved. 35 In the twelve cases in which dealings were
on a corporate basis, and the defect was not stated, nine were suits on a
note or draft,

6

one was a suit on a mortgage, 37 one on a contract,3 8 and

one to recover possession of a canal.3 9 In the cases in which the defect was
stated, comparatively few involved suits on notes. The conclusions to be
drawn from these findings are (i) that if the suit is against an ex-official
the chances are about even that the courts will refuse even to consider the
defect, and (2) if the suit is on a note, and dealings were on a corporate
basis, there is also a very good possibility that the court will refuse to consider the defect. With these exceptions the courts will usually consider the
particular defect.
An attempt to incorporateresulting in "colorable" compliance. The
cases on what constitutes "colorable" compliance show that defects in the
certificate, such as failure to state purposes, 40 and failure to file the certificate with the county, 41 are no objections to the association suing in its corporate name. Similar results follow when the defect is failure to measure
up to requirements for special classes of corporations, such as the amount
of insurance contracts necessary for an insurance company; 42 failure of the
43
state authorities to do an act, such as issuing a certificate of incorporation,
when the association has done
44 all that is required; and failure to pay in the
required amount of capital.
The only controverted problem raised by the cases in this group arises
when an insufficient number of shares has been subscribed for. The three
cases in this group all involved dealings on a corporate basis. In one case
the full capital had not been subscribed, and this was held not a valid de35. Seven Star Grange v. Ferguson, 98 Me. 176, 56 Atl. 648 (1903); American Forging
& Socket Co. v. Wiley, 206 Mich. 664, 173 N. W. 515 (1919) ; Montoya v. Hubbell, 28 N. M.
250, 210 Pac. 227 (1922) ; Thompson Optical Institute v. Thompson, 119 Ore. 252, 237 Pac.
965 (1925).
36. See, for example, Butchers Bank v. McDonald, 130 Mass. 264 (188); National

Insurance Co. v. Bowman, 6o Mo. 252 (1875).
37. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Copren Brothers, 45 Cal. App. 159, 187 Pac.
772 (1919).

38. Societe Titanor v. Paxton & Vierling Iron Works,

124

Neb. 570, 247 N. W. 356

(1933).

39. Imboden v. Etowah Mining Co., 7o Ga. 86 (1883).
40. Van Pelt v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n, 79 Ga. 439, 4 S. E. 5o (1887). Likewise
where the failure is to include the list of original shareholders, Blanc v. Germania National
Bank, u14 La. 739, 38 So. 537 (I95).
41. Grant Chrome Co. v. Marks, 92 Ore. 443, 18I Pac. 345 (i919) ; Schmitt v. Potter
Title & Trust Co., 6I Pa. Super. 301 (1915).

42. Raegener v. Equitable Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 33 App. Div. 231, 53 N. Y. Supp. 484
(1st Dep't 1898). Likewise where a building and loan association fails to get the necessary
number of members and stock subscriptions, Eagle Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Samuels, 43 App.
Div. 386, 6o N. Y. Supp. 9I (2d Dep't 1899).
43. Receivers of the Bank of Circleville v. Renick, 15 Oh1io 322 (1846).
44. Braintree Water Supply Co. v. Braintree, 146 Mass. 482, 16 N. E. 42o (1888); Wells
Co. v. Gastonia Cotton Manufacturing Co., 198 U. S. 177 (19O5).
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fense. 45 A second case held that an agreement between officers and subscribers for the refunding of subscriptions, which in effect reduced the bona
fide subscriptions below the required amount, was not a good defense."
In neither of these cases was the amount of the deficiency in subscriptions
stated. But in Eastern Products Corps. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R., 4 7
where only $8oo had been subscribed to a corporation with a stated capital
of $2,ooo,ooo, the court refused to allow the association to sue on a $475,000
contract. The great discrepancy between the apparent size of the association and the actual assets available made it unjust to allow it to enforce a
contract, particularly when the contract could not have been enforced against
it due to the lack of assets. This decision was in the face of a Tennessee
statute providing that a corporation's organization could not be collaterally
attacked. The court got around the statute by saying that no attack was
being made on the organization of the corporation, but merely on the
ability of the corporation to enter into a contract without any substantial
assets. Although a dissenting opinion pointed out that this was really an
attack on the organization, the result seems desirable. These decisions are
not necessarily in conflict. It is quite logical that the amount of the deficiency in subscriptions should be the determining factor.
The failure to accept a special charter and the total failure to file a
certificate of incorporation are two serious defects concerning which the
cases give little information. There is only one case involving the failure
to accept a charter. 48 In this case the defendant, who was the former
president of the association, was regarded as estopped from setting up this
defense. A different result might well have been reached if the suit had
been against an individual who had not dealt with the association. There
were two cases involving a failure to file the certificate of incorporation
with the secretary of state, but neither clearly involved a failure to file with
anyone at all. In one of these cases the certificate had been filed with the
county. 49 In the other no statement was made as to whether there had been
a filing elsewhere. 50 Suit was allowed in both cases.
Good Faith. The requirement of good faith where dealings are on a
corporate basis practically disappears upon a study of the cases. In four
cases there were false statements in the certificate, or in the application to
the state for a certificate. The false statements were in regard to the
amount of capital paid in, 51 the purposes of the corporation 52 and whether
the qualifying shares of the directors had been paid for in cash.5 3 All of
these alleged defects involved fraud and not accidental mistake, and in all
of them the association was allowed to sue. In the one case involving a
different type of fraud, which was an agreement by the officers to refund
subscriptions in order to get sufficient subscriptions to make up the required
45. Braintree Water Supply Co. v. Braintree, 146 Mass. 482, i6 N. E. 42o (1888).
46. Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, i Pet. 46 (U. S. 1828).
47. 151 Tenn. 239, 269 S. W. 4 (924), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 572 (925).
48. Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, io7 U. S. 466 (1882).
49. Leonardsville Bank v. Willard, 25 N. Y. 574 (1862).
5o. Franklin County Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blood, 255 Ill. App. I75 (929).
5i. Southern Bank of Georgia v. Williams, 25 Ga. 534 (i858).
52. La Salle v. Hamilton National Bank, 204 Ill. App. 518 (917) ; Lincoln Building &
Saving Ass'n v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173 (1878).
53. Lindenberger Cold Storage & Canning Co. v. Lindenberger, 235 Fed. 542 (W. D.
Wash. 1x6).
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amount of stock, the association was also allowed to sue. 54 Thus there is
practically no requirement of good faith in cases where dealings are on a
corporate basis, and no authority as to where they are not on a corporate
basis. It would seem that the same result would follow if a case of the
latter sort arose. There is a dictum by the Supreme Court of the United
States to the effect that the good faith of the incorporators is unimportant. 55
No valid statute authorizing such a corporation. There are three cases
in which there was no statute authorizing such a corporation. In two of
these the dealings were not on a corporate basis and the judgment is for
the defendant.56 The judgment is also for the defendant in the third case,
but it does not appear whether dealings were on a corporate basis.5 7 There
are four cases in which the alleged purpose of the association was illegal.
These cases are classified separately from those in which there is merely
no statute authorizing such a corporation, because the defect would seem
to be more serious where the purpose is actually illegal. These four cases
all involve dealings on a corporate basis. In three, the alleged purpose is
to buy or to hold real estate. One refuses recovery,5 8 while the other two
allow the suit,59 with no distinguishing facts apparent. 60 In the fourth case
the alleged purpose is usury, and the suit is allowed. 6 1 The cases in which
there is a statute authorizing such a corporation, but the statute is unconstitutional, are classified separately. They involve no moral failure or
negligence, and the defect would seem to be less serious. There are two
cases in which dealings were not on a corporate basis and in both the suit
is not allowed.02 There are five cases in which the dealings were on a corporate basis and in all of them the suit is allowed. 6 3 Summarizing, it seems
that the most important matter in this particular group is whether or not
the dealings were on a corporate basis. In all four of the cases in which
dealings were not on a corporate basis, the courts refuse to allow suit. In
eight of the nine cases in which dealings were on a corporate basis, the suit
is allowed.
User. There are two cases in which there was practically no user. In
one case a special franchise was granted by the city. A month later the city
revoked the franchise. The association then attempted to sue the city,
although no shares had been subscribed or anything else done under the
54- Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, I Pet. 46 (U. S.

1828).

55. See Wells Co. v. Gastonia Cotton Co., 198 U. S. 177, 185 (1905).

56. American Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota & N. IV. R. R., 157 Ill. 641 (1895) ; Even-

son v. Ellingson, 67 Wis. 634, 31 N. W. 342 (1887).

57. New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., ii Fed. 277 (E. D. La. 1882).
58. Imperial Building Co. v. Chicago Open Board of Trade, 238 Ill. ioo, 87 N. E. 167

(19o9).

59. La Salle v. Hamilton National Bank, 204 Ill. App. 518 (9)
; Mann Commission
Co. v. Ball, 48 S. W. (2d) 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
6o. The only basis on which a distinction could be drawn is that the charter specifically
stated that the purpose of the corporation was to hold real estate, in the case in which the
corporation was not allowed to sue. In the other cases it was merely alleged that the real
purpose of the association was to hold real estate. This does not appear to be a sound dis-

tinction.
6I. Lincoln Building & Saving Ass'n v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173 (1878).
62. Doboy & Union Island Telegraph Co. v. De Magathias, 25 Fed. 697 (C. C. S. D. Ga.
1885) ; Clark v. American Cannel Coal Co., 165 Ind. 213, 73 N. E. IO83 (19o).
63. See, e. g., Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400 (895) ; Black River Improvement Co. v. Holway, 85 Wis. 344, 55 N. W. 418 (1893).
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franchise. The court refused to allow the suit.64 In the other case the
suit was against a director for failing to proceed with the incorporation. The
certificate had been filed with the secretary of state, but no meetings of
shareholders or directors were ever held and no officers elected. 65 The court
denied suit, but this case should not be cited as laying down a rule for all
suits against officers under similar defects. The courts might well allow
suit where, for example, the officer had appropriated the association's property. As to user generally, very little in the way of business transactions
is necessary if the corporation is otherwise properly formed. In one case
and no
the only business in nine months had been to start three patent suits,
66
salaries had been paid the officers, but this was held sufficient user.
ABILITY TO SUE THE ASSOCIATION

IN

ITS CORPORATE NAME

The ability of a third person to sue the association in its corporate
name is, like the ability of an association to sue in its corporate name,
primarily a procedural problem. But there is a difference in that if a suit is
not allowed against the corporation, the costs and the delay go against the
innocent party, and the association to this extent profits by its own defects.
Because of this there seems to be very little, if any, reason why an association should not be subject to suit in its association name, at least if the
execution of the judgment is limited to the association property. Determining that an association may be sued in its corporate name does not
mean that the members of the association could not have been sued as if
partners. The real question is not whether the association is a corporation
or a partnership, but whether there is any reason why the courts should
not allow a suit against the association in its corporate name. As will be
seen from the following chart, there are noticeably fewer cases in this group
than there are when the association is the plaintiff.
in "colorable" compliance
i. Attempt to incorporate resulting
a. Failure to file certificate anywhere
b. No acceptance of charter
c. No articles of incorporation
d. Defects in the certificate itself
e. Defects in the execution of the certificate
f. Failure to file certificate with county
g. Failure to file other papers with county
h. No stock issued
2. Good faith (no cases)
3. No valid statute authorizing such a corporation
a. No statute to cover stated purpose

b. Statute unconstitutional
4. User
a. No user as a corporation

Dealings
not on a
corporate basis

Dealings on a
corporate basis

o
o
o

I cannot be sued

0

o
o
o
I

3
1
1
1
2

1o

o

2

1o

As is to be expected, these cases show a more liberal tendency to allow
suit than where the association is bringing suit. Two cases in which suits
against labor unions were allowed may be noted here for purposes of
comparison. If an association which never made any effort to become a
64. Aspen Water & Light Co. v. City of Aspen, 5 Colo. App. 12, 37 Pac. 728 (1894).
65. Martin v. Deetz, io2 Cal. 55, 36 Pac. 368 (894).
66. Kardo Co. v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 6th, 1i16).
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corporation may nevertheless be sued as though it were a corporation, why
should not all defectively formed corporations, at least those of great size,
be subject to suit in their corporate names? 67 In United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 68 the union was admittedly not a corporation. The other case involved a suit on an insurance policy and arose before
the Coronado case. The court allowed the suit, saying that the name implied a corporation and that the officials bore corporate titles. 69
There are two cases in which suit is allowed although the articles had
not been filed anywhere.70 One of these cases is not classified because it
does not appear whether dealings were or were not on a corporate basis.
There is a third case in which no certificate had been filed at the time of the
accident, although the certificate was subsequently filed. 7 1 In allowing the
suit, the court said that the defendant was a "de facto" corporation at the
time of the accident. The only case in which suit against the association is
not allowed is an early case in which no articles of agreement or certificate
of incorporation had been drawn up.7 2 It is not necessary that any shares
be created, even if the dealings were not on a corporate basis. 73 The courts
are also more liberal where the incorporation is under an unconstitutional
statute, allowing recovery where the dealings were not on a corporate
basis.74 In the one case involving user, the association, after receiving its
charter and electing officers, disregarded the officers and the members themselves carried on the business, acting as partners would, and the court
75
allowed the suit.
A corporation may, then, have any number of defects and still be
liable to suit, if there was an incorporation agreement, and even this exception may not now be necessary as the only case in point was decided in
1858. There are comparatively few cases on this problem because in the
great majority of cases where there are serious defects the plaintiff chooses
to sue the members as partners.
Conclusion
The traditional approach to the problem of determining the legal attributes of defectively formed "corporations" appears inadequate and misleading. The same defect in organization may give an association some
of the attributes of a corporation and some of the attributes of a partnership. Thus an association would be classed as a "de facto corporation"
for some purposes and not for others, there being no "de facto" standard
in vacuo. Also the traditional approach gives no consideration to the factor
67. The reason for allowing suits against labor unions in the
their size makes naming all the members impractical. This factor
in many of the cases of defectively formed corporations, but the
abridge the common law in this field for the sake of convenience is

association name is that
is admittedly not present
fact that the courts will
of interest.

68. 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
69. Dugan v. Association of Iron Workers, 2o2 Ili. App. 3o8 (1916).
70. Merrick v. Reynolds Engine & Governor Co., ioi Mass. 381 (1869); Hawes v.
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., ioi Mass. 385 (1869).
71. Frawley v. Tenafly Transportation Co., 95 N. J. L. 405, 113 AtI. 242 (1921).
72. Utley v. Union Tool Co., 77 Mass. 139 (1858).
73. McGinty v. Athol Reservoir Co., 155 Mass. 183, 29 N. E. 510 (1891) ; Ebeling v.
Independent Rural Telephone Co., 187 Minn. 604, 246 N. W. 373 (1933).
74. Shadford v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 130 Mich. 300, 89 N. W. 96o (19o2).
75. Missing Link Coal Co. v. Postawa, 139 Okla. 75, 281 Pac. 223 (1929).
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of dealings on a corporate basis, one of great importance in some problems,
such as whether the members shall be liable as partners, although of comparatively little importance in the question of suits in the association name.
The foregoing study of the cases may have clarified the questions as to one
particular attribute, the ability to sue and be sued in the "corporate" name,
and a somewhat similar approach seems advisable in dealing with other
attributes.
The large number of statutes which are designed to prevent collateral
attack on the incorporation procedure, indicates the general feeling against
dismissing cases on procedural grounds rather than on the merits of the
controversies. It has been seen that the courts have exhibited a similar
tendency even in the absence of statutes, the later decisions taking a more
liberal point of view, with a more frequent use of the word "estoppel",
which is used only as a means to an end. The relatively small number of
cases in which suit is not allowed leaves the courts a wide field in which to
allow suits without trampling on precedent. The statutes which are designed to eliminate this problem are desirable, but since courts are not
always given to literal interpretation of such statutes, it is still necessary to
those jurisdictions, and the above tendencies may be
refer to case law in 76
evidenced even there.
C. J. C., Jr.
Interstate Enforcement of Tax Judgments

The view that penal and revenue claims of a state, and judgments based
thereon, need not be enforced by other states has been subject to a great deal
of critical comment. 1 With the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,2 an important step has been taken tocommands of the full faith and
ward removing these limitations upon the
3
credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
The holding in the case was that a judgment for income taxes, properly
rendered in Wisconsin (the taxing state), must be given full faith and credit
in a federal district court of Illinois. This in itself makes a considerable
contribution, although a New Jersey court had previously reached a similar,
though less far-reaching, result. 4

There had been sufficient despair of the

76. Eastern Products Corps. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R., 151 Tenn.

239,

269 S. W. 4

(1924); Note (1935) 29 ILL. L. Rnv. 655.

I. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal aid Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HAv.
L. REv. 193; Hazlewood, Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcement of Tax
Judgments (1934) 19 MARQ. L. REv. io; Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV. 782; Note (1933) 18
CORN. L. Q. 581; (933) 42 YA4m L. J. 1131. The general rule is discussed in all the standard texts. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1408; GOODRICH, CONFLICT 0F LAWS (1927)
12; DicEY, CoNsi.cr OF LAWS (5th ed. 1932) 212; WHARTON, CONFLiCT OF LAWS (3d ed.
1905) 14, 18; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901) 21; STORY, CONFLIcr OF LAWS (8th ed.
1883) 840.
2. 56 Sup. Ct. 229 (I935). Justices
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § I.

McReynolds and Butler dissented without opinions.

4. New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., 112 N. J. L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (I934), (1935) 83 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 387, (934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 137, (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 137. The lower
court opinion of this case, io N. J. Misc. 1I6, 162 Atl. 872 (Sup. Ct. 1932) is noted in (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 1131 and (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 581. The judgment in this case was for a fran-
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likelihood of general adoption of such a view to cause the Restatement group
to express the law as squarely contrary to the decision now announced.5 But
the implications of the opinion go further. The language used indicates that
the Court may now require extraterritorial enforcement of revenue laws of
the states (even though not reduced to judgment in the taxing state),6 and
also the extension of full faith and credit to judgments based on strictly penal
claims of sister states. 7 If these questions are decided in the affirmative the
law in this field will have been given a strong forward impetus.
The rules of non-enforcement which are now being threatened are really
offshoots of the basic principle (which alone completely survived the Milwaukee County opinion) that the criminal law of a state will not be enforced
by courts of other states." The punishment of crime is thought to be a matter peculiarly concerning the intimate sovereign policy of a state, and aside
from extradition and interstate rendition of criminals, other states generally
will lend no aid. Whatever may be thought of the desirability of this attitude, the doctrine has become sufficiently imbedded in the law to preclude its
abandonment by judicial decision. Similar reasons have been advanced for
the non-enforcement of revenue claims of the states. For example, passing
upon a tax claim of a sister state necessarily involves considering the validity
of the tax itself and deciding whether enforcement of the claim would conflict with local public policy, and this is thought to lead to dangerous possibilities of ill will between the states. 9 It has been pointed out that it is more
reasonable to suppose that ill will would result from the refusal to hear a
sister state's tax claims at all, 10 but the policy against enforcement has found
frequent judicial expression.'" Other objections may be suggested, such as
procedural difficulties and intricacies of foreign law into which courts
chise tax imposed on foreign corporations for the privilege of doing business within the state
of New York. The Milwaukee County case, though also involving a particular type of tax
(income), is decided with no reference to the nature of the tax, whereas the New Jersey
court attached considerable importance to the fact that the tax in the Coe case was a fee for
a granted privilege.
5. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 443: "A valid foreign judgment for the
payment of money which has been obtained in favor of a state, a state agency, or a private
person, on a cause of action created by the law of the foreign state as a method of furthering
its own governmental interests will not be enforced." Illus. 2 makes it clear that this refers
to tax claims. In order to bring the section into line with the decision in New York v. Coe
Mfg. Co., 112 N. J. L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (1934), illus. 4 states that a state judgment against
a foreign corporation for a fee for the privilege of doing business within the state must be
given full faith and credit.
6. Instant case at 233.
7. Id. at 235.
8. RESTATEMENT, CONLICT OF LAws (1934) § 427. The rule was early announced by
Chief Justice Marshall in the case of The Antelope, io Wheat. 66, 123 (U. S. 1825), and
may be found discussed in the texts cited in note I, supra, at the places indicated. For a discussion of the extent to which this rule is actually applied in giving extraterritorial effect to
criminal convictions, see Note (935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 213. The test as to what constitutes a "penal" law is, in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 673-674 (1892), stated to be:
". . . whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State, or
to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act."
9. This rationale is best expressed in Judge Learned Hand's concurring opinion in
Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 6oo, 604 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
IO.Leflar, op. cit. supra note I, at 217.
II.Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 6oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), aff'd on another ground. 281
U. S. 18 (1930) ; see Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 290 (1888) ; Colorado v.
Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 85. 133 N. E. 357, 36o (1921) ; cf. Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Wenatchee Land Co., 122 Minn.266, 142 N. W. 305 (1913).
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allegedly should not be compelled to inquire. These also have been rather
effectively discredited,' 2 but court decisions have given small hope of any cooperation between the states in enforcing tax claims unreduced to judgment. 13 The ease of transferring from the jurisdiction attachable property
has made this rule an extremely disadvantageous one, and some states have
resorted to reciprocal legislation in an attempt to tighten the net around tax
evasion. 14 The following language by Justice Stone in the Milwaukee
County case has, in this connection, an importance which is immediately apparent:
"It has often been said, and in a few cases held, that statutes imposing
taxes are not entitled to full faith and credit. .

.

. Whether one state

must enforce the revenue laws of another remains an open question in
this court. .

.

. But we do not stop to inquire whether the considera-

tions which have been thought to preclude the enforcement of the penal
laws of one state in the courts of another are applicable to taxing statutes; or whether the mere possibility of embarrassment in their enforcement should stay the hand of the court of another state in cases where
in fact such embarrassment will not occur." 15
Since the question at hand was the enforcement of a judgment based
upon such a taxing statute, and not direct enforcement of the tax claim, no
definite holding on the broader issue was made. But in view of the above
language there seems to be a reasonably good chance that the further step
will be taken when an appropriate case is presented.
In the anxiety of the courts to avoid embarrassments thought to be involved in inspecting the sovereign policies of other states, the fact that enforcing a judgment need entail no probing into the claims on which the judgment is based, has been somewhat obscured. The opinion by Justice Stone
in the Milwaukee County case gives renewed emphasis to this factor. It is
pointed out that recovery on a judgment can generally be prevented only by
showing a lack of jurisdiction,' 0 a payment or other discharge of the obligation, 1 7 or a lack in the forum of a proper type of court in which to enforce
such a claim' Fraud in the procurement of the judgment is also recognized
12. See Leflar, op. cit. supra note i, at 217, 218.

13. See cases cited note ii,supra. In New York, a state to which a great deal of property is frequently removed, there has developed a consistent policy of non-enforcement of the
revenue laws of sister states. In addition to the cases of Moore v. Mitchell (decided in the
New York federal court) and Colorado v. Harbeck, both cited in note ii, supra, see Estate
of Martin, 255 N. Y. 359, 174 N. E. 753 (931) ; Matter of Anita Bliss, 121 Misc. 773, 202
N. Y. Supp. 185 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
14. At least fourteen states have enacted statutes for the reciprocal enforcement of state
inheritance taxes. It is interesting to note that New York is included in this group. N. Y.
Laws 1932, C. 333. For a full discussion of such legislation with citations to the statutes see
the Prentice-Hall Inheritance and Transfer Tax Service (iith ed. 1935) vol. I, tit. Reciprocity.
15. Instant case at 232-233.
16. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1874); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714
(1877).
17. First Nat. Bank v. Hahn, 197 Mo. App. 593, 198 S. W. 489 (1917).
18. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373 (1903).
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as a possible basis for attack on the judgment. 19 Trial of such issues as
these, it is said, "requires no scrutiny of its [the taxing state's] revenue laws
or of relations established by those laws with its citizens, and calls for no
pronouncement upon the policy of a sister state." 20 Further on appears an
observation, re-enforcing the above arguments, which throws added light
upon the attitude of the Court toward non-enforcement of tax claims of
sister states in general: "In the circumstances here disclosed no state can be
said to have a legitimate policy against payment of its neighbor's taxes, the
obligation of which has been judicially established by courts to whose judgments in practically every other instance it must give full faith and credit." 21
This seems to be a completely satisfactory refutation of the arguments
against enforcement. Yet in reaching this conclusion the Court was compelled to disown an embarrassing passage from its decision in Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co.22 There the Court had said: "The essential nature and real
foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment
upon it; and the technical rules, which regard the original claim as merged
in the judgment and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to
pay it, do not preclude a court . . . from ascertaining whether the claim
is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it." 23
Justice Stone replies that in several cases the Court has required that credit
be given to the judgment of another state although the claim on which the
judgment was founded would not have been directly enforceable in the
forum. 24 To the extent that the Pelican case says that full faith and credit
need not be given to a judgment unless the claim on which it is based is also
entitled to full faith and credit, it is expressly repudiated.
In another respect the opinion indicates that pre-existing notions as to
the current law may have to be revised. Judgments based on penal claims
have generally been thought unenforceable extraterritorially, 2 5 just as the
penal laws themselves will not be carried out in other states. The Restatement puts this as the present rule. 26 The language of the Court stressing the
fact that the tax claim had been reduced'to judgment would suggest that a
similar approach may be taken in a case involving a judgment on a penal law,
ig. See Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 304 (U. S. I866) for an indication that fraud
in the procurement of the judgment cannot be shown when the judgment is sued upon in another state. In Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (189o) the Court said at 112 that the
full faith and credit clause did not preclude an inquiry into whether the judgment was impeachable for a "manifest fraud."
20. Instant case at 233.
21. Id. at 234.
22.

23.

127 U. S. 265 (1888).

Id. at 292,

293.

24. In Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928) it was held that full faith and credit
must be given to a foreign judgment despite the fact that the judgment was based on a claim
which arose in the state of the forum, the original claim having been barred by the statute
of limitations in the state of the forum at the time the judgment was rendered. In Fauntleroy v. Lum, 21o U. S. 230 (i9o8) the foreign judgment was based on a gambling contract
which by the law of the forum (where it was made) was illegal. It was held that full faith
and credit must be given the judgment. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411 (1920)
involves the same general principle.
25. GOODRICH, CoNFLIrCT OF LAWS (1927) § 204; see Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127
U. S. 265, 290 (1888) ; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666 (1892). It has, however,
been held in some state courts that a judgment based upon a penal claim is entitled to full
faith and credit. Schuler v. Schuler, 209 IIl. 522, 71 N. E. 16 (19o4) ; Healy v. Root, 28
Mass. 389 (1831).
Contra: Arkansas v. Bowen, 3 App. D. C. 537 (1894).
26. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAvS (1934) § 443.
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and the Court furthers this belief by
stating expressly that the result in the
27
latter situation is an open question.
The practical consequences of the decision may turn out to be extremely
important. If tax claims are to be enforced extraterritorially even though not
reduced to judgment, a vexatious obstacle to tax enforcement will have been
unexpectedly removed, and the statutes providing for reciprocal collection of
taxes will become unnecessary. Even if future decisions of the Court do not
go that far, collection will be facilitated in that extraterritorial enforcement
may be assured by first reducing the claim to judgment.2 In any event, the
Milwaukee County case has given new stature to the full faith and credit
clause.
L.M.G.
27. "We intimate no opinion whether . . . full faith and credit must be given to such
a judgment even though a suit for the penalty before reduced to judgment could not be maintained outside of the state where imposed." Instant case at 235.
28. There may be difficulty in securing such a judgment if the person owing the tax has
fled from the jurisdiction and removed all his property. Even though the tax debtor has not
taken such desperate measures, the process of securing a judgment constitutes a bothersome
delay. See Note (935) 45 YALE L. J. 339, 350.

